EXHIBIT A

	1759
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
2	X
3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : 15-CR-00637(KAM)
4	i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
5	. United States Counthause
6	-against- : United States Courthouse : Brooklyn, New York
7	
8	: Thursday, July 6, 2017 MARTIN SHKRELI, : 9:00 a.m.
9	Defendant.
10	
11	TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIYO A. MATSUMOTO
12	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, and a jury
13	APPEARANCES:
14	For the Government: BRIDGET M. ROHDE, ESQ. Acting United States Attorney
15	Eastern District of New York 271 Cadman Plaza East
16	Brooklyn, New York 11201 BY: JACQUELYN M. KASULIS, ESQ.
17	ALIXANDRA ELEIS SMITH, ESQ. G. KARTHIK SRINIVASAN, ESQ.
18	Assistant United States Attorneys
19	For the Defendant: BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 767 Third Avenue
20	New York, New York 10017 BY:BENJAMIN BRAFMAN, ESQ.
21	MARC AGNIFILO, ESQ. ANDREA ZELLAN, ESQ.
22	JACOB KAPLAN, ESQ.
23	Court Reporter: Stacy A. Mace, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter
24	E-mail: SMaceRPR@gmail.com
25	Proceedings recorded by computerized stenography. Transcript produced by Computer-aided Transcription.

SAM OCR RMR CRR RPR

```
Rosenwald - direct - Srinivasan
                                                                1944
 1
    Α
          I assume so.
 2
          If MSMB Capital did not have an auditor, would that have
 3
     affected your investing decision?
          Sure.
 4
     Α
 5
               MR. AGNIFILO: Object to the form of the question.
     The hypothetical. If something, then would that affect. I
 6
 7
     know what he's trying to get at. I'm not trying to get in the
 8
    way.
               THE COURT: I am overruling the objection.
 9
10
               You may answer the question, sir. Do you need it
11
     read back?
12
               THE WITNESS: Yes, please.
13
               MR. SRINIVASAN: I can rust re-ask the question.
14
          If MSMB Capital did not have an auditor, would that have
15
    affected your investing decision?
          Sure.
16
    Α
17
    Q
         How?
18
          I probably would not have made the investment.
19
               MR. SRINIVASAN: Now, let's go to Page 35 of the
20
     .pdf, so that's Bates Number LR00078, 20 pages from where you
21
    are right now.
22
          Do you see the paragraph that starts: Attorneys?
23
    Α
         Yes.
24
               MR. SRINIVASAN: If we can zoom in, Ms. Balbin, on
25
    the paragraph that starts: Attorneys.
```

2070 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 - - X 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 15-CR-00637(KAM) 4 5 -against-United States Courthouse 6 Brooklyn, New York 7 Friday, July 7, 2017 8 MARTIN SHKRELI, 9:00 a.m. 9 Defendant. 10 11 TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIYO A. MATSUMOTO 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE, and a jury 13 APPEARANCES: For the Government: 14 BRIDGET M. ROHDE, ESQ. Acting United States Attorney Eastern District of New York 15 271 Cadman Plaza East 16 Brooklyn, New York 11201 JACQUEĹYŃ M. KASULIS, ESQ. BY: ALIXANDRA ELEIS SMITH, ESQ. 17 G. KARTHIK SRINIVASAN, ESQ. 18 Assistant United States Attorneys 19 For the Defendant: BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 767 Third Avenue 20 New York, New York 10017 BY: BENJAMIN BRAFMAN, ESQ. 21 MARC AGNIFILO, ESQ. ANDREA ZELLAN, ESQ. 22 JACOB KAPLAN. ESQ. Stacy A. Mace, RMR, CRR 23 Court Reporter Official Court Reporter 24 E-mail: SMaceRPR@gmail.com 25 Proceedings recorded by computerized stenography. Transcript produced by Computer-aided Transcription.

SAM OCR RMR CRR RPR

Kocher 🖛 direct 📮 Srinivasan 2319 It was presented to me originally that I would be 1 2 able to get my money back within one month if I gave them a 3 head's up one month in advance. And was this important to your investment decision? 4 5 Α Yes. 6 Would you still have invested in MSMB Healthcare if you 7 couldn't get your money out in a month's time? 8 No, because, generally speaking, I have very little cash, so when a project comes up, I need to be able to have 10 money on hand. 11 Before you invested in MSMB Healthcare, did you learn 12 anything about any hedge funds that Martin Shkreli had run 13 before MSMB Healthcare? 14 At that time, no. 15 Did the name Elea Capital ever come up in your conversations about MSMB Healthcare? 16 17 Not that I remember. If Mr. Shkreli had a prior hedge fund that had performed 18 19 poorly, would that have been important for you to know at the 20 time you were making your investment in MSMB Healthcare? 21 MR. BRAFMAN: Objection, Your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Overruled. You can answer the question. 23 Yes, of course, it would affect my opinion and judgment. Α 24 Mr. Kocher, did you sign any documents in connection with

25

your investment?

```
Kocher - direct - Srinivasan
                                                                2320
          Yes.
 1
    Α
 2
     Q
          What did you sign?
 3
          A subscription agreement.
 4
          I am going to show you what has been marked for
 5
    identification as Government Exhibit 33. Mr. Kocher, you have
    two binders in front of you. There is a larger one and a
 6
 7
    smaller one. If you could pull out the larger one for now,
 8
    and it is tab 33. I'm sorry, tab 35 in your binder.
 9
               Do you recognize this document?
10
          Yes. This is the subscription agreement.
    Α
11
          For what entity?
    Q
12
          This is MSMB Healthcare, L.P.
          Is this your subscription agreement?
13
    Q
14
          I believe it is.
    Α
15
               MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor, we move to admit
    Government Exhibit 33.
16
17
               MR. AGNIFILO: No objection.
18
               THE COURT: We will admit Government Exhibit 33.
19
               (Government's Exhibit 33 was received in evidence.)
20
         Now, Mr. Kocher, if we can go to the last page of this
21
    document, Bates stamp number R-011888. I think that is page
22
    12, the PDF.
23
         Yes. Page 11, actually.
24
    Q
         Did you sign this document?
25
         Yes, I did.
    Α
```

2339 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 15-CR-00637 (KAM) 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States Courthouse Brooklyn, New York 4 Plaintiff, July 10, 2017 5 -against-9:00 a.m. 6 MARTIN SHKRELI, 7 Defendant. 8 TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR TRIAL 9 BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIYO A. MATSUMOTO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 10 BEFORE A JURY 11 **APPEARANCES** 12 For the Government: BRIDGET M. ROHDE, ESQ. Acting United States Attorney 13 Eastern District of New York 271 Cadman Plaza East 14 Brooklyn, New York 11201 15 BY: JACQUELYN M. KASULIS, ESQ. BY: ALIXANDRA ELEIS SMITH, ESQ. BY: G. KARTHIK SRINIVASAN, ESQ. 16 Assistant United States Attorneys 17 For the Defendant: BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 18 767 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017 19 BY: BENJAMIN BRAFMAN, ESQ. BY: MARC AGNIFILO, ESQ. 20 BY: ANDREA ZELLAN, ESQ. 21 BY: JACOB KAPLAN, ESQ. 22 Court Reporter: Rivka Teich, CSR, RPR, RMR Phone: 718-613-2268 23 Email: RivkaTeich@gmail.com 24 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer-aided transcription. 25

2437 MARSHALL - DIRECT - MR. SRINIVASAN approved by the FDA. So a lot of instances depended on FDA 1 2 decision, which could be positive or negative. At this point, in about December 2014, had the name Elea 3 4 Capital came up with your discussion with the defendant? 5 No. 6 If the defendant had run a prior hedge fund that had 7 performed poorly, would that have been important for you to know when you make your investment? 8 9 MR. BRAFMAN: Objection, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. Yes, it would have. 11 12 How so? 13 Well, you want to look at the entire track record of the 14 person who is making the security selection. So if he had a 15 bad run, negative result, in it a prior hedge fund, that would 16 have certainly been something I would have taken into account. 17 You also mentioned that you received a subscription 18 agreement; is that right? 19 Α Yes. 20 I'm showing you what is marked for identification as 21 Government's Exhibit 25, which is tab 16 in your binder. 22 A Yes, I have it. 23 What is this document? 24 It's first a questionnaire, which you have to fill out to

show that you're qualified investor for this sort of

25

2339 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 2 15-CR-00637 (KAM) 3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, United States Courthouse 4 Plaintiff, Brooklyn, New York 5 July 10, 2017 -against-9:00 a.m. 6 MARTIN SHKRELI, 7 Defendant. 8 9 TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIYO A. MATSUMOTO 10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE BEFORE A JURY 11 APPEARANCES 12 For the Government: BRIDGET M. ROHDE, ESQ. 13 Acting United States Attorney Eastern District of New York 14 271 Cadman Plaza East Brooklyn, New York 11201 15 BY: JACQUELYN M. KASULIS, ESQ. BY: ALIXANDRA ELEIS SMITH, ESQ. 16 BY: G. KARTHIK SRINIVASAN, ESQ. Assistant United States Attorneys 17 For the Defendant: BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 18 767 Third Avenue New York, New York 10017 19 BY: BENJAMIN BRAFMAN, ESQ. 20 BY: MARC AGNIFILO, ESQ. BY: ANDREA ZELLAN, ESQ. 21 BY: JACOB KAPLAN, ESQ. 22 Court Reporter: Rivka Teich, CSR, RPR, RMR 23 Phone: 718-613-2268 Email: RivkaTeich@gmail.com 24 Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript 25 produced by computer-aided transcription.

PROCEEDINGS

MR. AGNIFILO: Your Honor, I have a three-minute objection to make. I can do it now or at the end of the day.

THE COURT: Let's do it now. If it's something you would like me to think about I'd rather correct it now rather than wait until the end of the day when the witness is finished testifying.

MR. AGNIFILO: Yes. We've objected, I think with a number of the witnesses, to questions along the lines of, 'would a certain fact or a certain condition have been important to you,' or, 'would this have been an important factor whether or not to invest.'.

We've objected to those questions. There is also sort of a subtle refraining of the question, which is, if you would have known a certain fact would you have invested.

We've objected to those with many of the witnesses as well.

The reason we're objecting is the question is framed such that the omission is apparently a material term that the witness would have wanted to know.

While that's all well and good, under the Supreme Court decision in Matrixx Initiatives Versus Siracusano, 563 United States, page 27, 2011, the standard is an objective standard. It's a reasonable investor. It's not any one particular investor. It's not a subjective standard.

So it's really irrelevant at the end of the day in terms of the misrepresentation by omission that any particular

PROCEEDINGS

investor thinking a particular condition or fact is dispositive of whether he or she would invest.

I also note the Supreme Court Basic Versus Levinson, 485 United States 224 from 1988, says very clearly that silence absent a duty to disclose is not misleading under 10B5, the Securities Laws. The problem with the questions as being framed is there is no establishment of a duty on the part of Mr. Shkreli or MSMB to say whether or not he was involved in Elea Capital or other things that the prosecution has repeatedly used to frame a question.

So that's the basis that we've objected. But I just want the Court to know why we we've been objecting.

THE COURT: May I, just to make sure I understand.

The 10B5 issue comes up with public corporations, these are questions regarding his knowledge or lack of knowledge when he made the investment decision, right, in the hedge fund, who's not a registered security.

MR. AGNIFILO: I don't think that the Supreme Court in Basic or in Matrixx makes the distinction. They are talking --

THE COURT: You said it was not a violation under 10B5, that's why I thought it had to be a publicly-traded corporation.

MR. AGNIFILO: The facts in Basic happened to involve a publicly-traded corporation. But the Supreme Court

PROCEEDINGS

in these two cases, and there are other cases, the point that needs to be made is that an omission is a different type of animal than an affirmative misrepresentation. There are other requirements that come with an omission that don't exist when someone says something that is arguably false and misleading. And that distinction is being blurred in the way the questions are framed. And we've been objecting because at the end of the day it suggests that somehow, that someone did something wrong by not, for instance, saying that Martin was with Elea Capital, when in fact, there is no establishment of a duty that he disclose that information.

And so to the extent that it's an objective reasonable investor standard, rather than a subjective investor standard, it's really an irrelevant question at the end of the day.

Your Honor, so I wanted to introduce that topic. I think. That's been the reason we've been objecting to these questions.

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from the Government.

MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, we need to look into these two cases that counsel just raised. We do believe these questions are appropriate. We have in fact also charged wire fraud, where there is material omissions and misrepresentations, so the omissions piece is important for us

Rivka Teich CSR, RPR, RMR Official Court Reporter

to prove.

Additionally, we've been very careful in the way that we're framing the questions. It's not, 'if you learned X.' It's, 'if that fact exists but if there was a prior hedge fund that not performed well that the defendant was associated with.' So we've been careful in the way we've asked the questions purposely.

Also, if there is a reasonable investor standard we have to establish the facts to make the argument that a reasonable investor would find these omissions and misrepresentations material. So some of the questions go to the omissions piece and some of them go to the misrep piece.

For example, when the defendant has said he has an auditor, and if we ask, 'if there was no auditor would that have been important to you,' the answer is yes. The so then it establishes the misrepresentations. We can go back and look at the law that counsel cites. We didn't have the notice about the law prior to this point, but we can certainly raise any additional issues with the Court or additional responses. But this is our response now. We think it's entirely appropriate. We believe we should be able to continue to ask these questions.

THE COURT: I mean, my understanding is that the Government has the burden to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that whether there were material misstatements or omissions.

Materiality, you say is objective, I agree. But I think that to ask the investors whether they were aware of, so for example a discrepancy between what they were told and what the facts may be, or whether certain facts had they known whether that would have influenced their investment decision, I think is something that — again, I will look at the cases — but it seems to me, in my mind, it was directly relevant to the Government's proof. I'll look at the cases as you have characterized them.

Are we going to expect ongoing objections until this is resolved? I'll look at the cases. I can't do it now

obviously.

It does seem maybe this was an issue you — it would have been nice to have had some prior notice of it. We'll

15 look at it as soon as we can.

MR. AGNIFILO: I started doing research when Mr. Brafman objected to it with the witness who is still on the stand. The objection was overruled.

It occurred to me at that point that we, I would look into, dig a little deeper, as to why we've been objecting.

THE COURT: I figure you're objecting for a reason.

MR. AGNIFILO: We tend to try to have a reason.

THE COURT: I would hope so.

MR. AGNIFILO: But I want to give your Honor a

clearer idea of the basis, that's why I'm bringing it up now.

MS. KASULIS: Your Honor, we have been eliciting these questions in the same format with respect to each witness since our first witness, which was about a week-and-a-half ago now. So we will continue to solicit those sorts of answers unless we hear otherwise from the Court as to those questions.

THE COURT: We'll look into it. I can't say we'll have an answer for you by the time the next witness is asked a question, but we'll get to it as soon as we can.

It would have nice if you raised it even before the lunch hour, I could have looked at the cases then. But, we have what we have and I'll deal with what you've given me now. All right.

MR. AGNIFILO: I did most the research over the lunch hour. Judge, as I do further research, I share it with the Court.

THE COURT: I appreciate that. I'm just saying this has been going on for a week-and-a-half, there are sort of set questions that you can expect. We've heard again and again, I'm not saying it's rote, but each witness is asked to look at certain documents, and asked what was important to their decision et cetera, et cetera, so I'm just noting that it would have been nice, as I've said before, to hear from you earlier. But we'll now look into what we have been given and

2481 MARSHALL - CROSS - MR. BRAFMAN I'll try to make a decision before the next witness is asked 1 2 the series of questions. MR. AGNIFILO: Thank you, Judge. 3 THE COURT: Did you want to bring the witness back 4 5 on the stand, please? MR. BRAFMAN: Your Honor, when the witness testifies 6 7 could you just remind him, sometimes he leans back, his voice 8 doesn't get picked up on the microphone, it's hard to hear. THE COURT: I will. If I'm having trouble, I'm 9 10 concerned about everyone else of. 11 MR. BRAFMAN: Thank you. 12 (Jury enters the courtroom.) 13 THE COURT: All our jurors are back, sir, you're 14 still under oath. Please have a seat. You may proceed, Mr. Brafman. 15 16 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. BRAFMAN: 17 Good afternoon, Mr. Marshall. 18 0 19 Good afternoon. 20 Mr. Marshall, if you can, I know it's a long day, but if can you speak into the microphone, sometimes your voice 21 22 doesn't pick up in the back. 23 Sir, my name is Ben Brafman. We've never met; is 24 that correct? 25 That's true.

```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
 2
     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 3
                                      15 CR 627(KAM)
              versus
 4
                                          U.S. Courthouse
    MARTIN SHKRELI,
                                           225 Cadman Plaza East
 5
                                           Brooklyn, NY 11201
                       Defendant. July 11th, 2017
 6
                        ----x 9:00 a. m.
 7
              TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR JURY TRIAL
                  BEFORE THE HONORABLE KIYO MATSUMOTO
 8
                   UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
 9
10
                              APPEARANCES
     For the Government:
                          BRIDGET ROHDE
11
                          UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
12
                          EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
                          271 Cadman Plaza East
13
                          Brooklyn, New York 11201
                          BY: JACQUELYN KASULIS, ESQ.
                              ALIXANDRA SMITH, ESQ.
14
                              KARTHIK SRINIVASAN, ESQ.
15
                          Assistant United States Attorneys
    For the Defendant:
                          BRAFMAN & ASSOCIATES, PC
16
                          767 Third Avenue
                          New York, New York 10017
17
                          BY: BENJAMIN BRAFMAN, ESQ.
18
                               MARC AGNIFILO, ESQ.
                               ANDREA ZELLAN, ESQ.
19
                               JACOB KAPLAN, ESQ.
20
21
    Court Reporter: LISA SCHMID, CCR, RMR
                          Official Court Reporter
22
                          225 Cadman Plaza East
                          Brooklyn, New York 11201
                          Phone: 718-613-2644
23
                          Fax: 718-613-2379
24
    Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript
25
    produced by computer-aided transcription.
```

(Outside the presence of the jury.) 1 2 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, just so you know, there were 3 five binders for this witness, so we put three of them on the 4 side so it's not blocking. 5 THE COURT: No problem. Do the parties have any matters to bring to my 6 7 attention? 8 MS. KASULIS: Yes, your Honor. We wanted to briefly 9 respond to the issue that the defense raised about the 10 hypothetical questions, asking the witnesses about 11 hypothetical questions. I'm going to let Mr. Srinivasan inform the Court. 12 13 THE COURT: All right. Sure. 14 MR. SRINIVASAN: So, your Honor, I think there were two issues raised by the defense yesterday, whether it's 15 16 proper to get into issues like whether the defendant disclosed 17 Alia Capital (phonetic); in other words, information about his track record in the hedge fund industry, and other issues 18 19 we've been asking on the issue of materiality. And the 20 second is the form of the questions we've been asking. 21 Mr. Agnifilo cited Basic versus Levenson and Matrix 22 Initiatives, and I think that what those cases stand for is the proposition that silence -- it's true that silence absent 23 a duty to disclose is not necessarily actionable, but where a 24

25

person makes statements and puts information out there, that

can generate a duty to disclose the truth if the statements that that person is making are not truthful. So I think that we've had a lot of evidence in this case about the statements that are made by the defendant; about his track record, about whether Capital had an auditor, so on and so forth.

We've been asking the witnesses about these issues, and we think that the evidence is going to prove that the truth was something very, very different. So I don't think that a duty to disclose is limited to some specific statutory, regulatory or contractual obligation; for example, the PPM, so I think that we have a strong basis under Matrix Initiatives, which says that it's a highly stacked specific inquiry, and I think specific to the investing decisions of these investors.

On the second issue, the form of the questions, there's very strong authority — and I have some cases that I can hand up to your Honor, and I can hand them to defense counsel also — which say that hypothetical questions are, quote, "plainly relevant and probative when they concern the materiality of the defendant's actions in the context of a securities fraud prosecution. That's United States versus Hatfield 2010 WL 2541057, and that's a Judge Seebart decision from 2010.

And there are a number of other decisions. In the Second Circuit, for example, there's a case called

United States versus Cuti, where in another fraud prosecution

the government called the auditors of the company to say, 1 2 well, you know, if X fact that management had represented to you had been different, would you have handled the financials 3 differently? And the 2nd Circuit said clearly that those 4 5 sorts of questions are appropriate. And the citation for Cuti is 720 F.3d 453. Again, I have copies I can hand up to the 6 Court. 7 8 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 9 Mr. Agnifilo. 10 MR. AGNIFILO: What I'll try to do -- and I'll try 11 to do it over lunch -- is try to take a look at Hatfield and 12 Cuti, and give your Honor a principled answer. 13 THE COURT: Well, if the question comes up today --14 MR. AGNIFILO: I don't think it will come up before 15 lunch. 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MR. AGNIFILO: Because I believe a witness that's been on the stand all morning is a witness that is bringing in 18 19 bank records and summarizing them, so I don't think we have an 2.0 investor before lunch. If I see that we're going to get it before lunch, I'll try to do some quick research and take a 21 22 look at some cases. 23 THE COURT: Thank you. MR. AGNIFILO: And my colleague has provided me with 24 25 copies of the case, which I very much appreciate.

1 (Pause in proceedings.) 2 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, one last thing, before the 3 witness today, we're going to read one other stipulation, 4 which is Government Exhibit 804. 5 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. The jurors are here, so they're coming up. 6 7 (In the presence of the jury.) 8 THE COURT: Good morning. All our jurors are 9 present. 10 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Please have a 11 seat, everyone. All parties and counsel are also present, and 12 we are ready to proceed with the government's next witness. 13 MS. SMITH: Your Honor, before the government calls 14 its next witness, we'd like to read one additional stipulation into the record, which is Government Exhibit 804, and we have 15 16 that on the prosecution laptop. 17 It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the undersigned parties that: 18 19 One, Government Exhibit 117-6 is a true and accurate 20 copy of a settlement agreement between Merrill Lynch Pierce 21 Thenner (phonetic) Smith Inc., Merrill Lynch, and the 22 Defendant Martin Shkreli, Marek Bicek (phonetic), and MSMB 23 Capital Management L.P., dated September 5, 2012, and is 24 admissible in evidence; 25 Two, Exhibit A to Government Exhibit 117-6, which is

```
waived his presence to be here at oral argument. We discussed
 1
 2
     it clearly.
 3
               THE COURT: Okay. I just didn't want to hear
     later --
 4
 5
               MR. BRAFMAN:
                            No, no, no.
 6
               THE COURT: -- that he didn't really waive it.
 7
               Let's go forward. Both Mr. Agnifilo and Mr. Brafman
 8
     have confirmed Mr. Shkreli has waived his presence at this
 9
     argument regarding the questions that the government was
10
     asking of certain investors regarding their investment
11
     decisions having known certain facts were perhaps different
     than that the facts that were presented to them in the
12
13
     offering documents.
14
               MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor, if I could clarify, I
     don't think our questions ever said if you knew or if you
15
16
     learned that. I think we phrased it very carefully to avoid
17
     that formulation the assume the fact not in evidence. It was
     more if MSMB Capital did not have an auditor. So it's not --
18
19
     I think Mr. Agnifilo said sometimes we shaded into saying if
20
     you had learned that yesterday and I think we were trying to
21
     be careful to kind of avoid that formulation in our questions.
22
               THE COURT: All right. So who wants to be heard
23
     from first, Mr. Agnifilo?
24
               MR. AGNIFILO: I'm happy, yes.
25
               So I reviewed the cases that the government provided
```

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

and I'm grateful they brought the cases. In regard to the cued decays I think the cued decays is distinct and to sort of highlights the problem that I had with the situation that we've been facing. In the Cuti decision, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the fact that the witnesses were experienced accountants and that the experienced accountants were basically that the hypothetical question there drew on undisputed rules of accounting that these accountants would know, and so when the accountants were asked in substance, you know, would you have done the accounting differently had this been the case instead of this been the case, I think the Second Circuit in Cuti was okay with that hypothetical question because, as the Second Circuit put it, there's somewhat of a, I guess continuum between fact and opinion, and because we were talking about experienced accountants and we were talking about accounting rules, this was more along the lines of on the factual side rather than on the side of opinion. My concern with the questions that we've had in this area in the trial is that they're purely subjective opinions. They can't be verified. They can't be shown to be false. If someone says, I would not have invested had I known that there was not an auditor, or I would have wanted to know about the Orex trade, or something along those lines, there is no body of information that the questioner could use to show that the

witness is lying or mistaken. And that's one of the things that the Second Circuit focused on in the *Cuti* decision when they said that there was a way of cross-examining the witness because there was essentially a body of fact, that being the accounting rules, you know, that these particular witnesses were well versed in.

My concern here is — it's really two-fold. It's one that it's really in the nature of an opinion, but really, and what I was sort of getting at I guess more yesterday, is it is really irrelevant. I mean, because the standard is an objective standard, it's an objective investor standard. So whether a particular investor is, you know, specifically concerned about liquidity or specifically concerned about an auditor or is particularly miffed by the fact that the Orex trade wasn't mentioned, is really in a sense misleading. I mean, because it's suggesting to the jury that something wrong legally was done because Mr. Shkreli didn't inform someone of the Orex trade or didn't inform someone that he managed Elea Capital, and that's not the standard so it's really an irrelevant question. And none of that situation is not addressed by either of the cases that the government provided.

And in regard to the *Hatfield* decision, the *Hatfield* decision is far from a ringing endorsement of the hypothetical questions. I mean, Judge Seybert was actually quite critical of the government in that case and thought that their

2.2

questions were inappropriate, but not inappropriate to the degree where it warranted a mistrial. So I don't know that the Hatfield decision really helps us one way or the other because I thought that Judge Seybert at the end of the day thought that the questioning was not perfect, far from it, because if Your Honor recalled — and I know we didn't have lot of time to read the cases — there were two motions pending in the Hatfield decision. The defense was asking for a mistrial and the government is essentially asking for their line of questioning to be essentially blessed by the Court as appropriate and the Court did neither. The Court didn't grant the defense a mistrial and the Court also didn't bless the questioning, and was quite critical of the questioning toward the end of the decision.

So looking at the *Cuti* decision, I don't think that the *Cuti* decision makes this particular questioning of this particular witness appropriate necessarily because they're talking about essentially rank subjective opinion, this is what I believe, this is what I wanted to know. And with a reasonable objective investor standard that we know exists from the *Matrix* decision and from *Basic* versus *Levinson*, I don't think it's an appropriate question.

THE COURT: Well, you can't just throw the reasonable investor concept in front of the jury and ask them in a vacuum to try to determine what a reasonable investor

would do. I think one way to get there is to — just let's note Mr. Shkreli is back with us. One way to do that, as Judge Seybert noted, was to hear testimony from investors that would help the jury understand what would be important to an investor. What information would be important, what information influenced their investor decision. And I believe she noted in <code>Hatfield</code> that what influence an investment decision is probative of what a reasonable investor would have considered.

So there has to be some way for the government to establish that standard and it seems to me that the jury could listen to those investors and decide whether they exemplify a reasonable investor, maybe they're not, but to understand what facts those investors considered important to their investment decision I think is relevant and material to their burden of proof.

How else do you propose that the government establish what a reasonable investor would do?

MR. AGNIFILO: I think they can do it without asking the hypothetical question. You can say is liquidity important to you? Yes, you're done. Is having an auditor important to you? Yes. I don't think you can go the next step and say the hypothetical question that they've asked. That's -- my concern is what the hypothetical -- that's the only thing we've objected to. We haven't objected to an investor saying

that certain liquidity is important. Certainly Mr. Kocher was able to testify that liquidity is important to him. Some other investor witnesses said that AUM was important to them. I think they're permitted to do that.

What we objected to is the hypothetical question that follows that up. And I don't think it's necessary, I don't think it advances the ball. I think it's an inappropriate question. I think it suggests the framing of a legal issue that's inaccurate and it frames the legal issue as one of subjectivity and I think it's an inappropriate question for some of the same reasons that Judge Seybert had a problem with the questioning in the Hatfield decision.

THE COURT: Well, sir, I know that you cited the fact that the witnesses in *Cuti* were accountants and were applying their accounting principles, but the circuit also said that we hold that the challenged testimony was properly admitted as factual testimony under the alternative holding that it is admissible as lay opinion under Rule 701 which permits layperson to give an opinion, if it is limited to one that is rationally based on the witness' perceptions, i.e. what were they were told, what did they read in this case; B, helpful to clearly understand the witness' testimony or to determining a fact in issue, were they given information that they needed to make an informed investment decision; and C not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

within the scope of 702.

Here I know that you've made a point that the investors were quite sophisticated, they had previously invested in different investment vehicles including hedge funds and that they knew what some of these terms meant, they knew what the risks were, they were familiar with some of the language, but I do think that it's appropriate to probe the witnesses as to what was important to them when they made their decision.

Cuti also says when the issue for the fact finder's determination is reduced to impact, that is whether a witness would have acted differently if he had been aware of additional information, the witness so testifying is engaged in a process of reasoning familiar in every day life, so it is not -- and they make the point that the testimony was not rooted exclusively in the witness' expertise and did not address the soundness of accounting rules. So there was an alternative holding in Cuti I think that's applicable here as lay testimony to the extent we've characterized them or we may wish to perceive them as sophisticated investors.

MR. AGNIFILO: One thing I just point out -- I'm not sure if Your Honor was done with the analysis.

THE COURT: No, I just was addressing *Cuti*, but go ahead.

MR. AGNIFILO: Looking at the Cuti decision on

page 459 it says, *Cuti* was able to argue that the auditor could not have been deceived about the accounting for that transaction. And the reason the Court says that is because they're talking about a body of accounting rules.

The problem with what we have here, it's really just the subjective operation of the witness' mind in a hypothetical sense. Had you known this or however they phrased it, you know, would you have invested, no. It's just not -- it's just not really a probative answer. I mean, it's a witness answering a hypothetical question, speculating about facts that in fact have not occurred, which is the whole reason they asked the question and then looking back three years and giving a dispositive answer about what seems to be an ultimate issue in the case.

So I don't think it's anything -- most respectfully, I don't think it's anything like the decision in *Cuti*.

Because what I think the Second Circuit focused on in *Cuti* is that these witnesses were cross-examinable and they're cross-examinable because there is a body of accounting information that the questioner could use to cross-examine them.

Here, these answers are virtually bulletproof. If someone like, you know, Kocher says, yeah, had I known there was no liquidity, I wouldn't have invested, we're stuck with that answer. There is no way of cross-examining Mr. Kocher

about what was in his mind, which is really in the nature of a pure opinion, so I think it's distinct.

Your Honor's insights, yeah, I agree that is certainly part of what the Second Circuit held, but I think the issues are fundamentally distinct. I think the subject matter of the testimony is fundamentally distinct, and I think the hypothetical questions are, most respectfully, inadmissible.

MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor, I think the Court has the issues clear in mind. The only thing I would add, Your Honor, is the defense has every ability to cross-examine the witnesses about what's going on in their minds and their reactions to this information, the decision to keep investing or not investing, redeeming, I think they've been fully able to do that.

When Mr. Agnifilo talks about *Cuti*, in that case the importance of the accounting rules was about the foundation for the auditors' ability to testify. So they were able to, you know, cross-examine them on the foundation, they were able to compare the rules versus what actually happened, for example.

Here we have the investors' actions, they're testifying, they're able to cross-examine them. I don't want to belabor the point, if the Court has any questions about Cuti or Hatfield I'm happy to answer them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

2.2

23

24

25

THE COURT: Would you be able to try to craft your questions, as Mr. Agnifilo suggested, that is, would it have been important to you to fully be apprised of the fund manager's background? Would the statement that he was successful with other funds, was that an important factor, why was it important? I'm just wondering, the way Mr. Agnifilo is proposing that I guess you want to preclude the government from asking whether if they were aware of other aspects of Mr. Shkreli's background with regards to fund management whether their investment decisions would have been different? MR. AGNIFILO: Yes, that's the heart of the objection. MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor I think -- I'm sorry if the Court's not finished. THE COURT: No, go ahead. THE WITNESS: I think two points, Your Honor. have to prove omissions and we have to prove the materiality of those omissions. So if you look at Basic or Matrix it's not simply something is important or a witness subjectively something is important to me, we have to establish that it affects the total mix of information that goes in the investing decision. So you could have a situation where a defendant lies about the weather to a witness and the witness comes in and says that was important to me. You can make an argument that

2.0

that had nothing to do with the investing decision. I think we have to tie those things all together to meet the materiality element in the securities laws. So that's why in Cuti, for example, there are a number of cases cited from the First, Sixth, the Ninth, a number of circuits, Cuti itself, Hatfield, it allows us to tie that materiality element all together to meet what we're supposed to do under the securities laws. Because otherwise we just have potentially innocuous misstatements or witnesses making clearly subjective statements about what is important to them and then arguably we might have a problem as far as what a reasonable investor would have considered important or would have affected the total mix.

So I think the hypothetical questions are the

So I think the hypothetical questions are the appropriate way to get to the omissions especially.

THE COURT: In the Basic case the Supreme Court discussed its decision in TSE Industries, which rose in the context of disclosure statements in a proxy solicitation. And in Basic they noted that in the TSE case the Court had explained that to fulfill the materiality requirement, there must be substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of the information available. We expressly adopt the TSE Industries standard of materiality in the 10B and 10B5 context. It seems

2.0

to me that what the court is doing is saying that, look, that materiality standard that was previously established in *TSE* with regard to disclosure or omissions in proxies now applies in this Rule 10B and 10B5 context.

Materiality depends on the significance that the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information. The fact specific inquiry we endorse is consistent with the approach a number of courts have taken in assessing the materiality of merger negotiations.

Again, the facts matter, the witness' statements are directly relevant to the government's burden of proving the materiality of statements or misstatements or omissions.

MR. AGNIFILO: I don't quarrel with any of that. I think the government can absolutely bring out that someone cared about liquidity, that someone cared about an auditor and we didn't object to any of those questions. We only objected to the hypothetical question. That's it. I mean, I agree completely that they have to show the overall mix of information and how it affected the investor, I agree with it completely. I think the hypothetical question is a question of a different nature, which is why we only objected to that. We didn't object to the whole line of questioning, we didn't object to the establishment of materiality with direct questions of what they cared about, we only objected to the

hypothetical question. And I --

THE COURT: Would it make a difference if there was evidence in the record that supported the question and made it not hypothetical, i.e. the Elea Capital problem.

MR. AGNIFILO: Cuti says it would make a difference. The Second Circuit in Cuti says it would make a difference, correct. But Cuti also doesn't say that one factor is dispositive. I mean, the way I read the holding in Cuti that it was one of three central things that the Court focused on, the other two were the nature of the witnesses which was — and, yes, the investors here are sophisticated, but of a different nature.

THE COURT: They have a specific alternate holding that these were also lay witnesses and they explain why this line of questioning was appropriate. Whether or not you call them experts or lay witnesses, that wasn't a second holding that they made in assessing that testimony.

MR. AGNIFILO: They essentially said it was admissible lay opinion. But I think it's admissible lay opinion with the context being accountants and accounting rules.

My concern with the hypothetical question that we have here is there's no context for the question, you're just stuck with the answer. Had you known this, would you have invested? No. There's nothing we can do with that. I mean,

we can say he's lying, we can say he's misremembering kind of what his decision was at the time, but it's void of factual content in a sense, which I think the Court in *Cuti* really focused on by saying you can cross examine these accountants because they're talking about accounting rules, and they're talking about how accounting is done.

When one of these witnesses says, had this been different, I wouldn't have invested you're just stuck with the answer. There is no way of cross-examining because it's the subjective, somewhat hypothetical subjective operation of the person's mind, but it also is sort of dressed up as I think a dispositive issue in the case and that's made us uneasy about it, that's why we think it's inadmissible.

I think the government gets everywhere -- and I'm not here to help them, I think they get everywhere they need to be by asking the witnesses what's important to them. I think they can do that and without the hypothetical question. I don't know really why they need it except that it's sort of like an added little zinger but I think it's an inappropriate zinger.

MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor, I think our questions have been crafted not to ask the witness to assume a fact as true. We've expressly avoided that. We're not going to get every single fact in the case through one witness.

To give you a concrete example, Lindsay Rosenwald,

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

in the September of 2009 VPM for MSMB Capital, asked is there a representation in there that says Fulvio & Associates are the auditors for MSMB Capital, and so we ask him, you know, is that important to you the presence of an auditor and would that have affected your decision. Then there is a stipulation, which the defense agreed to, that Fulvio & Associates were not the auditors, were never the auditors and so that ties those things together. And so we'll do that with stipulations or calling witnesses, but I think we're going to tie those things together and what we're establishing is materiality. Just getting importance to an investor is not enough. You have to give context for that. And we have to be able to lay a factual foundation. I think Mr. Agnifilo talks a lot about the reasonable investor, the objective reasonable investor but we don't deal with hypothetical witnesses in the case, right? mean, we have to give the jury a factual context and then they're free to argue that that's not reasonable for the investor to make that statement or to rely on the representation or however they want to argue it it but I don't think that precludes us from using these questions to establish the factual foundation. I think we made a good faith -- and I think we have a good faith basis to ask these questions that we've seen pretty much every one of these witnesses which will tell the jury and the Court, in

2.2.

cross-examination or in direct examination, was this thing important to them, was it not important to them, would it have an affect and what kind of affect it would have had on them.

They can cross-examine them on every single one of those issues. So I think that the questions we've been asking are proper and they are the way we can tie out materiality.

THE COURT: Yes, look, I think that what the government is describing is consistent with what Mr. Agnifilo is proposing except to the extent if you have asked, assume a fact X, then would your decision have been different, that would not be appropriate. But as long as you stick to the formulation you just described I think we're all on the same page that that would be appropriate.

MR. SRINIVASAN: That's correct, Your Honor. Our formulation is to take auditors, for example, if MSMB Capital did not have an auditor, would that affected your investing decision? We have not said I'm asking you to assume MSMB Capital doesn't have an auditor or if you learned that MSMB Capital doesn't have auditor, that's for example the formulation that Judge Seybert denied in the Hatfield case, if you have that formulation. I think we tried very carefully to do what Cuti says, which is, you know, there's a fact that the witness believes to be true, pose sort of the contrary fact which will the government will then tie out with other evidence and what is the reaction to that. I think we

followed exactly what Cuti says.

2.

THE COURT: What if you asked it, why would the engagement of an auditor or lack of an auditor be important to you, so you're giving them to -- and they can describe, would that be acceptable for Mr. Agnifilo's concerns?

MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor, I think at least for the auditors, it's an affirmative misrepresentation which is a little bit different. But, secondly, I think the witnesses have gone on to explain that. So you have Schuyler Marshall, for example, the auditor from yesterday talks about having, you know, independent check on financial information was important to him and it's something if it didn't exist he wouldn't have invested. I think the witnesses are providing that foundation for why these various pieces of information would have affected their decision and how.

THE COURT: Shall we move forward and hope for the best? It seems to me that they are trying very consciously to not drive the witness to respond to questions that offend what you are trying to prevent. I think that the government does have to utilize these witnesses to establish what a reasonable investor would consider important to their investment decision and they're conscious of your concerns, and they will do their best to avoid any formulation that would draw concerns, but I think they do have to explore the witnesses whether or not certain facts that were represented were important to their

investment decision --1 2 MR. AGNIFILO: I understand. 3 THE COURT: -- and to solicit why or why not these 4 facts would be important. So, for example, I'm trying to 5 remember what drew your objection. The first one was the 6 thing about the loans but that was discarded, but the second 7 question might have gone to -- do you remember? Does anyone 8 have a clear recollection? We can try to look up the 9 transcript, but --10 MR. AGNIFILO: I believe we objected during the 11 Kocher --12 THE COURT: Is it the Elea Capital question? 13 MR. AGNIFILO: I think we objected to that. MR. SRINIVASAN: Yes. 14 15 MR. AGNIFILO: I think --16 THE COURT: Would the fund manager's success or lack 17 of success have been an important factor in your investment decision, yes or no. Why would the success be important, why 1.8 19 would lack of success be important. That seems to me to be --MR. SRINIVASAN: That's right. 20 21 THE COURT: -- appropriate so that they could get a 22 sense of -- elicit from the witness why certain disclosures or omissions would have affected your investment decision. 23 24 MR. AGNIFILO: I don't want to belabor the point, I 25 think what's different about omissions is omissions are only

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

actionable in the absence of a duty to disclose. So they have not -- there is no duty in the record, that's the problem. if we get back to the Cuti decision --THE COURT: Well, there is a duty if there is an entry statement of fact, material fact, it becomes important to disclose. MR. AGNIFILO: I agree. THE COURT: If you have to make sure that the statement of fact is not misleading. MR. AGNIFILO: But with the Elea Capital omission there was -- there's been proffered no partial statement that has to be corrected. It seems to me an omission is actionable criminally if there's a partial statement that is misleading, if there is a duty to disclose like a fiduciary duty or statutory duty to disclose. In the absence of the three, an omission isn't actionable. So it's not an appropriate question to ask subjectively, would you have liked to know this. THE COURT: Well, in this case I think Mr. Marshall just volunteered that if the fund manager had a bad track record it would definitely affect his investment decision. MR. AGNIFILO: I think that's appropriate. we've only objected when it gets more specific and somewhat hypothetical. I think a witness has an absolute right to say,

this is important to me. I think they can absolutely say

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I think what the government can't do is they can't say that. specifically would that omission have influenced your investment decision in the absence of establishing a duty, because they are suggesting there is something wrong with it. The very question -- the reason they're asking the question is because it sounds like they did something wrong. That's why they're insisting on asking the question now. They want to establish through the question it sounds like you did something wrong, but the law says otherwise, so that's why we object to that line of questioning to actually that specific, the hypothetical question. THE COURT: Well, in terms of omissions is your main focus on the Elea issue or are there other omissions that are troubling you? MR. AGNIFILO: The Elea issue is one, I think the Orex trade, you know, would you have liked to have known about the Orex trade, I just don't think it's an appropriate question. I don't think there is -- there is no duty in the record that a hedge fund manager has an obligation to disclose losses or disclose all the trades. THE COURT: I think what we have, though, in addition to the lack of disclosure is a performance report saying you're doing great and look at all this money, this entire fund is up above the Standard & Poors 500. That's -MR. SRINIVASAN: Exactly, Your Honor.

8

9

11

12

14

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: -- that's the misstatement. So I mean 1 2 whether that's an omission or whether that's a misstatement, 3 it's an issue that they are entitled to present. 4 MR. AGNIFILO: Listen, what I'll do going forward, I 5 appreciate the time that everyone has taken, if a hypothetical 6 question is asked that I think is objectionable, I'll just 7 object, we don't need to have a sidebar but the basis would be the substance of the discussion. THE COURT: You can just say the one word 10 "hypothetical" --MR. AGNIFILO: Very good. THE COURT: -- and Mr. Srinivasan or whoever else is 13 questioning the witness for the government will know to reformulate the question or elicit the information in some 15 other way that doesn't draw an objection. MR. SRINIVASAN: Your Honor, I don't think it would necessarily necessitate us to reformulating the question, right? I mean the questions we've been asking I think are proper under Cuti and Hatfield. They've been limited to sort of specific issues that we're alleging misrepresentations and omission that are in the case and are part of the record. We're not sort of free form going into everything about the defendant, you know, if you'd known something about the defendant would have that affected your investing decision.

mean, issues like, you know, when he talked about his track

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

2.1

22

23

24

25

record or listening that he I think he described his track record to investors, 12 years as a fund manager, good returns, good performance history, you know, if the defendant had run a prior hedge fund that performed poorly, would have that affected your investing decision. I think it's word for word the question we asked of Sarah Hassan and that we tried to use it with every single one, but Your Honor overruled the objection on that one. So I don't think we should have to reformulate the question or hypothetical. I think the questions we've been asking are consistent with the everything the Court has been saying so far in materiality. If we go far afield and into the subjects that have nothing to do with the case, then I guess that's the relevance objection which is different than the objection Mr. Agnifilo is making now. MR. AGNIFILO: To answer one of Your Honor's questions, Mr. Kocher was asked, if you had learned of any personal loans to the defendant what, if any, affect would that have --MR. SRINIVASAN: Which was objected to. THE COURT: And they withdrew it and circled back. MR. AGNIFILO: Right, that's right. THE COURT: So that's off the table. MR. AGNIFILO: Right. Well, because it turns out they were trying to link it to something that the defendant

1 might have said in one of his statements, but that ended up 2 not being admissible. But my point is --3 MR. SRINIVASAN: We pulled back on them, Judge, it's 4 not in the case. 5 MR. AGNIFILO: I was going to say that. Yes, I know 6 they withdrew it. 7 THE COURT: Give me something that we know is going 8 to come up again that's going to cause you to jump up and 9 object. 10 MR. AGNIFILO: They know what they're going to ask. 11 THE COURT: Well, no, but in terms of omissions it 12 seems to be the Elea issue. 13 MR. AGNIFILO: It's Elea but they could 14 theoretically - I don't know what they're going to ask. The 15 Elea --16 THE COURT: And the other issue about the Orex trade wiping out the entire fund I think, yes, that's an omission 17 18 but they also have alleged misstatements regarding performance 19 of the fund and the health of the fund. So I think at the end 20 of the day they don't need to even ask a hypothetical in that 21 manner. 22 MR. AGNIFILO: I will object sparingly and briefly, 23 I promise. THE COURT: Okay, let's get the jury back. 24 25 MR. AGNIFILO: Your Honor, can I ask -= can we have